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The Next Time the World Goes Downhill: America and the 1983 Ethiopian
Famine
BETHANY SHARPE
University of Kentucky
Introduction
On December 10, 1985, Ronald Reagan signed a proclamation establishing a
Human Rights Day in the United States. During the ceremony, he said that
“America has, since its founding, been a refuge for those suffering under the yoke
of oppression.” As if to further persuade his audience of the importance of this
refuge in contemporary world politics, Reagan described governments throughout
the world that, according to him, stood in antipathy to U.S. liberal-democratic
values. He wrote of Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. He also wrote of
Ethiopia. He said, in particular reference to Ethiopia, that this was a “Marxist
government that used famine to punish large segments of its own
population…And the people and governments of the democracies have responded
generously to those pleas with tangible evidence of our concern.”1 Although the
famine began in 1983 with counter-insurgency strategies instituted by Ethiopian
leader Chairman Mengistu in the Northern regions of the country, two years
passed before attention in the United States focused on the great humanitarian
emergency taking place within that country.2 The increased attention culminated
in the great LiveAid and Band Aid concerts and “We are the world” recording
which garnered over sixty million dollars intended for African famine relief.3 The
songs, resulting concerts, and the outcry about famine conditions proved much
more than a straightforward relief effort. The humanitarian aid, referred to as
“tangible evidence of our concern” by Reagan, were as much about articulating a
specific vision of a future world as it was about providing immediate relief to
broken and vulnerable bodies so far away.
This paper argues that the vision of a future world articulated by media,
government, and aid groups coalesced around the transformation of Ethiopian
famine victims from “unenlightened” peoples into world citizens that would act as
torchbearers of liberal values, attitudes, and behaviors.4 In short, relief efforts
1

“Remarks on Signing the Bill of Rights Day and the Human Rights Day and Week
Proclamation,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36797 , accessed April 4, 2015.
2
Alexander De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 1991).
3
Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief, and Media (UK: Sean Kingston Press, 2010).
4
In a draft response to a letter proposing a regional food crisis center, Executive Secretary
Malcolm Butler wrote that he strongly urged the author to consider a more subtle approach to food
crises by working with those “African states choosing to implement improved agronomic practices
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acted as a beacon of hope for a unified world that conformed to these liberal
principles. The management of the aid effort through the consumption of media
images and the public’s purchasing power remained critical to that
transformation. In the moment of humanitarian crisis that was the Ethiopian
famine, the three varied forces of media, private non-profits, and government
commingled to entrench a specific liberal understanding of the future world order
that recognized individual choice, goal-tending, and personal accountability as the
necessary ingredients to promote global progress.5 Ultimately, this world of
thriving competition would render disasters like the famine obsolete. As media
images and documentaries depicted the glaring reality of death in the refugee
camps, relief efforts invited the public to participate in the emergency through
purchasing power, and the humanitarian response generated specific claims on
those receiving aid. The specific nature of this invitation allowed Americans to
use the famine as an opportunity to remake and redefine visions of progress
abroad.
In addition, this paper will discuss the conservative Cold War ideology
that underpinned much of the future world vision that these three groups shared.
The Cold War discourse used by all three groups to discuss the famine relied on a
specific narrative in which communist and socialist countries subordinated the
freedoms and liberties of the individual to the state which resulted in tyrannical
rule. Just as importantly, such Cold War discourse framed liberal democracies
like the United States as heroes who could, should, and would intervene on behalf
of oppressed people. Indeed, Cold War ideas acted as an influential motivator for
the public and media to pursue humanitarian aid. Even as both groups seemingly
viewed the emergency as one which highlighted the basic equality of all humanity
and rushed to meet the basic needs of man, it was Cold War politics that moved to
the media, the U.S. government, and the public to act.6
Africa Redux: Media images and the need for aid
Media coverage of the famine surged in the fall of 1984 after American news
stations picked up footage shot by the BBC of a refugee camp in Korem, Ethiopia.
English reporter Michael Buerk first broke the story of the famine when he found
his way into the camp in October and began reporting on the huge numbers of
people traveling to the area in search of food. As he described the scene as one of
a “biblical famine…now in the twentieth century,” cameras panned out to show
and enlightened agricultural policies.” December 26, 1984, NARA RECORD GROUP 286. The
final version of the draft had replaced the phrase “more appropriate” agricultural policies.
5
Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982): 8-9. I
place Rosenberg’s conception of expansion in the context of emergency situations.
6
Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2012).
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thousands of bodies covered in blankets huddled next to each other. At other
moments, the camera panned in to show close-ups of children crying, fear written
across their faces. In other scenes, viewers saw mothers holding tiny babies in an
attempt to breast-feed even though no milk remained in mothers’ malnourished
bodies. The cameras highlighted the acute frustration of the babies as they cried
out at the lack of milk. Within the same scene, fathers walked through the crowds
carrying the shrouded, tiny bodies of babies that had died, seemingly from lack of
food.7 Graphic images stunned audiences by showing starving Ethiopians literally
dying in front of the camera.8
As Fassin suggests in his theorization of humanitarianism, observers of the
famine engaged with suffering at a distance, they did so only in highly qualified
ways within well-defined and rigid boundaries. Media renderings of Ethiopians
as a monolithic bloc of suffering allowed the reader to create their own narrative
about the event and attach their own assumptions about the photos and images
they saw, including the understanding of Ethiopia as a nation of innocent,
dependent, and helpless children.9 A smaller photo inserted next to the burial
preparation photo in the Life article, reinforced this theme as it showed a man
gently placing his recently deceased four year-old daughter on a blanket.10 Like
the burial photo of the woman discussed above, the central point of concern is the
death of the child and the inability of the parent to prevent such an end. Readers
only learn very briefly the age and name of the daughter, but no more which
facilitated a connection to the images based on the imagining of a shared pain.
The limited textual context given about the victims allowed observers to
rely on their own understandings of the world to make sense of the images.11 In
this way, they disengaged with the full context of the victims’ lives, ignoring the
complexity and historicity of the political situation facing the victims, by relying
on their own understandings of the pain the victims faced.12 Little mention was
made, for instance, of the continuous warfare that had been raging since at least
the early 1960s between the Ethiopian government and its provinces in the north
7

Michael Buerk News Report of Ethiopia, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYOj_6OYuJc,
accessed August 1, 2014.
8
Joseph Berger, “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia Are Pouring into Relief Agencies,” New
York Times, October 28, 1984.
9
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003): 2223.
10
David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life Magazine, April
1985, 126.
11
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003): 2223; John Ashworth, “The Relationship Between Capitalism and Humanitarianism,” The American
Historical Review 92 (1987): 816.
12
Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: the making and unmaking of the world (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985): 162.
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and the south.13 With little or no individualization of the people photographed, the
consumption of media images about the famine invested the reader with a
significant amount of assumptive power over what constituted an appropriate
famine victim. These assumptions would eventually inform the kind of
purchasing decisions consumers made in the emergency, by inviting them to
anchor these images with their own narratives of the famine.
One of the most visible and cogent narratives used to make sense of the
famine centered on the Cold War. The Life article highlighted the distinct Cold
War discourse Americans incorporated in their reports of the famine. Speculation
over how and why the Ethiopian government pursued certain food and emergency
policies throughout the crisis served as an acknowledgement of deeper ideological
forces at work and exposed how many Americans engaged with the political
elements of the crisis. Images of innocent famine victims suffering at the hands
of an evil Marxist-Lenninist regime deployed a simplified political schema to
interpret the crisis: the Ethiopian people, often viewed as childlike and innocent,
suffered at the hands of the communists and American responsibility mandated
that efforts be made to save them.14 References to this simplified understanding
abounded. One article, for example, argued that before any progress could be
made in the crisis, American leaders needed to recognize the root cause of the
famine issue as a political consequence of a communist regime. The author
admonished that before the US rush headlong into a relief effort they must
recognize that “adverse weather conditions set the stage for Ethiopia’s disaster,
but it is the political priorities of Ethiopia’s dictator, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu
Haile Mariam, that have crippled Ethiopian agriculture and reduced its ability to
cope with the drought.”15
The constant heralding of American progress contained distinct
paternalistic threads and acted as at least one guide marker in America’s
relationships and interactions with the world.16 Carmen Martinez Novo discusses
paternalism as a subtler version of racism. In this form of racism dominant groups
use discourses “that have discriminatory effects” which are “constructed as
manifestations of love” for those who have been deemed different, childlike, and

13

Alex de Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (London: African Watch
Report, 1991):39.
14
“Expulsions from Ethiopian Camp Suspected,” Washington Post, July 28, 1985, NARA Record
Group 286, Media Folder
15
Edwin J. Jr., “A Plan for Rescuing Starving Ethiopians,” Washington Post, December 27, 1984.
16
Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 19151940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001): 89 and Melani McAllister gets at
this in her work Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & US Interests in the Middle East since 1945
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005): 40 and 80-83 and her discussions of
“benevolent supremacy.”
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not equal.17 In the famine, racism coded as benevolent guidance shaped ideas of
what did and did not constituted progress, infused media reports of the crisis, and
acted as a litmus test of how Ethiopians responded to the emergency. News
reports about daily life in the refugee camps gave readers a glimpse into Ethiopian
lives and created comparisons between the “progress” of an American way of life
and other more “primitive” cultures. Such comparisons tended to reveal the
outcomes of “primitive” cultures as tragic and backward. In the Life article, for
example, a graphic photograph shows a famine victim lying on her side on a bare
floor covered by a blanket. Next to her legs is a newborn baby still attached by the
umbilical cord. A MSF midwife tells the reporter that although there is an
obstetrics table available to the Ethiopian women, most “prefer to squat on a
swatch of black plastic on the floor.” Embedded within this comment is the
suggestion that Ethiopian women chose to remain outside any of the obstetrics
technology that facilitates “positive outcomes.”
Such a decision privileged Ethiopian women’s own understanding of the
birthing process and the body’s ability to perform in that process over Western
constructs of childbirth. The aid worker does goes on to say, “I knew this method
of having babies was possible but I never saw it before…Now I think: Why not?
It’s more natural.”18 However, this particular photo of a natural childbirth is
placed next to photos of women delousing each other upon entrance to the camps
and amidst other photos of starving bodies. Implied is the subtle suggestion that
the preferred natural mode of childbirth, and the attending natural lifestyle, incurs
substantial risks because it eschews the authoritative knowledge of medicine and
technology that manages saving lives that is presented in popular culture
references like movies and television shows.19 Here, “natural” stands in for
“primitive.” In this particular scenario it becomes natural for aid workers, mostly
Western, to step in and guide Ethiopian women in this emergency towards a more
perfect understanding of how progress in areas like medicine can ease areas of
their lives like childbirth.
Utilizing a paternalistic discourse generated images and descriptions of
Ethiopian famine victims as unable to meet their most basic needs and valorized
the Western aid workers who acted on their behalf. According to the article, in
many ways the aid workers of MSF, or Medicine San Frontiers, became the only
conduit to survival. One photo underscores this with the image of a white, female
17

Carmen Martinez Novo, Who Defines Indigenous: Identities, Development, Intellectuals, and
the State in Northern Mexico (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2006): 10-11, 143-147.
18
David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life Magazine, April
1985, 127.
19
Pamela K. Stone, “A History of Western Medicine, Labor, and Birth,” in Childbirth Across
Cultures: Ideas and practices of pregnancy, childbirth, and the Postpartum, ed. Helaine Selin
(Amherst: Springer Verlag, 2009), 50.
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aid worker from MSF walking steadily ahead of a gaggle of children in her
charge. She is quoted as saying after meeting with the RRC that, “I was really fed
up after the meeting with the RRC…I wanted to leave. But if I can still help a few
people, there is a reason to stay.” Rooted within this statement is hierarchy of
power overlaid on a sense of need; the famine victims need her to stay because
only she, or other aid workers like her, have the capacity to defend the victims
from the Mengistu’s Marxist government. Another paragraph references Benedict
Clement, a physician in the children’s ward, who is “lovingly called Mother by
her patients.”20 In this case, Clemente is providing information, expertise, and
care for her charges in a way that other Ethiopians cannot– not even their own
mothers. Clement fulfills a filial role by acting as a mother defending her
children, who happen to be Ethiopians of all ages. In still another description,
readers are told that in the face of huge numbers of refugees coming into the
camp, “six doctors, ten nurses and a midwife face the wall-to-wall crush with a
kind of determined cheerfulness.”21 Readers, working from a strong heritage of
stereotypes about Africa, are given the sense that the huge numbers of poor,
pitiful victims are incapable of fending off the effects of Mengistu’s government
on their own.22 Like children, they needed stronger, wiser adults to protect and
defend them.
Cold War and paternalistic discourse shaped the reception of the famine
by American audiences and interjected a specific formulation of the outcome of
the relief effort that surged forward. However, turning to traditional ideological
explanations allowed followers of the emergency to work around the ambivalence
surrounding the famine. Ideological explanations helped mask the racial
underpinnings of famine representations because aid efforts were described as a
way to guide and redirect childlike famine victims. Ethiopians and their nation
had to be saved, but in emerging from the crisis they had to be a different kind of
Ethiopian. Not only did their bodies require nourishment and sustenance, but they
also needed to learn the behavioral principles of independence and choicemaking. Just as American children had to be instilled with core tenets of
liberalism that focused on independence and choice-making in order to forge a
life of prosperity, so, too did the figurative children of Ethiopia. As the
ideological vision of Ethiopia as a stronger, more liberal people and nation took
shape, Americans began placing greater claims on the relief effort and recipients
of aid as a means to ensure that vision came to fruition.
20

David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life Magazine, April
1985, 127.
21
Ibid.
22
Amanda McVety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 26-27; Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues (New
York: Hill and Wang, 2000): 105-109.
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Seen in this light, viewers understood in the famine a dire need for
outsiders to step in and act as defenders and provisioners of aid. In this story, the
aid workers and volunteers take center stage as their actions are described as
“heroic” and elevated to an almost celebrity-like status. The plight of the famine
victims becomes secondary to the bravery of the volunteers working on their
behalf and suggests that without the vision of the aid workers miserable
conditions will remain the status-quo. One grant submitted to the USAID
explicitly speaks to the dire state of affairs in Africa that could potentially hamper
even the efficiency of American aid workers if not carefully addressed. The
group AfriCare, a development organization that had been working in Africa
since the 1970s, developed a grant project to place U.S. medical teams in the
camp sites as a means to provide emergency medical assistance. Writing in lineitem justifications for a grant proposal submitted to USAID, the author noted that
for those individuals volunteering to serve on the aid mission team, “the living
conditions in the areas of Ethiopia in which they will be working…will involve
major hardships for these individuals.”23 The grant went on to conclude that, “One
has to actually visit the areas in question to have an idea of the emotional drain on
the individuals faced with trying to maintain health services for the thousands of
people facing starvation and living in conditions of absolute miser. In order to
alleviate the strain on the volunteer personnel, AfriCare believes it is necessary to
include some time during the period for the volunteers to get away from their
depressing environment.”24 Ultimately, the author of the grant expects the cost of
doing aid work in Africa to exact a high toll, but it is the expectation of a fruitful
return that pushes the aid effort forward.
Making cents: the problem of aid and the future of Ethiopia
The first visual images and text of the famine stunned many Americans into
action and relied on a well-known narrative to do so; the images created a story
which cast the famine victims as apolitical pawns of a communist government
that would undertake any lengths to strip people of freedom. Here, the association
between children, innocence, and lack of political acumen played a central role in
justifying the need for American donors to invest in the crisis with aid dollars,
technology, and time. Colleen Williams, a concerned citizen, underscored this
connection when she wrote to Vice President Bush that “my personal opinion on
all this is I feel it was the Ethiopian government’s fault …. and I feel the
Ethiopian people shouldn’t have to suffer for this.”25
Dramatically increasing media attention on the crisis, highlighting
23

Africare grant, page 17, NARA Record Group 286.
Ibid.
25
Letter to VP Bush, File Folder: Project Ethiopia, Drought Declared, Box 6, Record Group 286.
24
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victims’ innocence, and emphasizing them as apolitical pawns in a communist
game had two consequences. First, increased media attention triggered an
emotional response from American viewers and prompted huge numbers of
individuals to contribute to the Ethiopian aid effort.26 This effort coalesced into a
world-wide care community in which amounts of money flowed from both large
and small aid and relief groups into the aid effort in numbers never before seen.27
Second, as this compassion collective grew, a loosely structured community
developed and placed greater claims on the recipients of aid. They demanded
Ethiopians transform their values and behaviors into usable, workable traits that
would prevent such a tragedy from happening again. In this way, aid providers
circumscribed the images of adult Africans as innocent children and informed the
means through which individual and group donors approached aid efforts.
Donations and relief efforts became as much about providing dollars as about
grooming the “children” of Africa into responsible adults.
The care community consisted of disparate segments that ranged from
children, to businesses, to schools. Though the donations and offers of aid began
as isolated, individual occasions to end suffering, eventually a loosely formed
community formed around famine relief. Simplifying the political and historical
context of the situation, media images of the disaster fostered a sense of urgency,
and for a brief moment opened a window of imagined equality based on the
vulnerability of broken and weakened bodies.28 Pulled by emotion and working
under the vision of equality, people rallied to the aid effort. Many thousands of
ordinary Americans called into relief centers asking how they could help and
offering to donate money.29
It wasn’t just adults that thought they could make a difference. In May of
1985, the Los Angeles Unified School District spent two weeks pitting schools
against each other to see which one would wind up on top as the number one
fundraiser for money for Ethiopian famine victims. They aimed to raise $250,000
for needed supplies in the country. The ultimate goal of the campaign was to
“help stop the dying and instill in students a sense of caring for the plight of
others.”30 The strategies various schools employed to raise money were wide26

Fassin argues that emergencies attract large numbers of people in the early stages b/c of
imagined equality
27
Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief, and Media (UK: Sean Kingston Press, 2010); Clifford
May, “U.S. Will Give Development Aid to Ethiopia,” New York Times, May 9, 1985; Joseph
Berger, “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia Are Pouring Into Relief Agencies,” New York Times,
October 26, 1984.
28
Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2012).
29
Interaction Grant, NARA Record Group 286.
30
“Valley Schools Pitch In: Students’ Initiative Boosts Famine Aid,” Los Angeles Times, May 25,
1985.
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ranging. Some presided over auctions, others held dances, and others had foreignfood sales, a riff on the usual bake sales common to school functions. Students did
manage to reach their fundraising goal. One school alone, Birmingham High
School, presented a check to the school board for $8,018.18.31 One school council
member said of the reason for so much student involvement, “I think maybe kids
are coming out of their apathy…..People are becoming aware of the world again.
But it seems like it’s the ‘in’ thing to be concerned about.”
With a growing community involved in the famine and as more people
entered into this community, expectations grew around the outcome of donation
relief. Coalescing around a set identity and experience of caring for others, media
recognition of this group effort imbued large and small donors with a sense of
power over where their money went and how it was spent. Alluding to a
disagreement between Ethiopia and the United States over the extent of aid in
relation to the proportion of famine, media headlines cited relief officials
declaring that Ethiopia was “biting the hand the feeds it.”32 Such sentiments were
embedded within a hierarchy of power relations between nation-states and jarred
with the rhetoric of Americans giving aid freely to any in need.33 Individual
donors, for example, clamored for a visible return on the money they donated and
still felt disappointment years later when Ethiopia faced the prospect of another
devastating famine in 2004. During the relief effort of 2004, one radio caller
“expressed irritation and outrage that Ethiopia was still in crisis fifteen years later
after she had donated money to the Band-Aid appeal in the mid-1980s. What had
happened to all the money, she demanded. And why couldn’t Ethiopia look after
itself? The programmer presenter asked whether she would be donating money to
the relief effort this time. ‘Certainly not,’ she replied.”34 The sense of monetary
accountability pervaded reports of the relief effort so thoroughly that one report
cautioned against too much expectation. He discussed the difficulty of
administering aid in famine-stricken areas and wrote that donors “must deal with
one of the world’s least attractive governments. But this can be done without
illusion and with an honest reckoning to Americans who contributed so much to
Ethiopian relief.”35
Public understanding of the famine soon coupled monetary accountability
with ideological accountability. Heeding a certain call meant that many in the
United States, and other countries, understood this humanitarian disaster as an
31

“Birmingham Students Present Famine Check,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1985.
Irvin Molotsky, “Relief Official Accuses Ethiopia of ‘Biting the Hand’ that Feeds it,” New York
Times, December 13, 1984.
33
Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism
(Minneapolist: University of Minnesota Press, 2000): 20.
34
Peter Biles, “Too Great a Burden,” The World Today 56 (2000):4-6.
35
“Feeding Ethiopia, Without Illusions,” New York Times, January 19, 1985.
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opportunity for ordinary Americans to collectively remake conditions in the world
which precipitated suffering and deprivation. Popular culture magazines provided
a simple answer to frustrations with conditions like those in Ethiopia that allowed
famines to take place. One reader summed up this sentiment when they wrote in
to the editor that, “The next time someone tells me the world is going downhill,
I’ll just remember what 43 of the biggest names in in music did to make it better.
It took USA for Africa to make me realize that I, too, can help!.”36
Other facets of the emergency soon emerged that contributed to donor
expectations, including anxieties about race. As the aid campaign took form
through direct relief programming and development activities, deeply political
assumptions about dependency, aid, and race in the domestic context informed the
creation of those initiatives taking place at the international level. Domestically,
race framed an on-going debate concerning the abuse of government sponsored
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).37 Although
by the time of the Ethiopian famine “racial science had long been discredited
among scientists and physical anthropologists,” many Americans still continued
to use racial categorization as a way to explain contemporary political contexts.38
Images and a discourse of African-American mothers on welfare and abusing the
program flourished.39 As a result, stereotypes of African-Americans as lazy and
dependent took root, and the role of welfare remained heatedly debated in the
creation of a productive citizenry.40
The Ethiopian famine magnified the discourse around dependency and aid,
and placing the conversation in the international arena heightened an awareness of
what was at stake with aid. With current domestic aid debates acting as the
backdrop, many donors feared that aid could sap the industriousness and vitality
of Ethiopia’s future. Instead, what would emerge was a nation dependent on other
nations – a macrocosm of what was happening with aid in the United States. To
avoid this fate, many American donors made greater ideological claims on the
recipients of aid during the famine based on fears that a proliferation of
unmanaged aid would create a world that discouraged the full manifestation of a
thriving, liberal atmosphere and the attending freedoms, privileges, and rights.
As discussions around aid need and delivery progressed, issues over
dependent behavior emerged as the core site for individual and national
36

“Letters to the Editor,” Life Magazine, April 1985.
Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle For Civil Rights in the North
(New York: Random House, 2008): 394-396, 519-521, 524-529.
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Melani McAllister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & US Interests in the Middle East since
1945 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005): 148.
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40
Ibid.
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transformation and created fertile ground for donors to make claims on aid
recipients. A post-famine Ethiopia had to include people who were diligent, hardworking, and able to fully contribute to the success of the nation through labor. In
June 1985, a month before the largest fundraising event of the famine campaign
took place with the dual concerts, Gerry Salole voiced concerns that the massive
amount of aid destined for Ethiopia opened the possibility of sabotaging that
nation’s future by engraining a sense of entitlement in famine victims’ perception
of their circumstances. Salole, the field director for Save the Children, implied
that receiving such a large amount of aid in such a short time period would
cultivate a sense of dependency.41 He elaborated on these fears when he stated,
“We need to try to understand what happens to people who are getting something
for nothing… This has to be creating bizarre ideas about those who are providing
the relief and generally what the world is like.” In articulating uneasiness with the
relationship between aid and its recipients, Salole raised questions about the
management and end-result of aid. He suggested that if aid continued unabated
without some kind of investment or repayment from the victim, the victim would
first, develop a misconception about how the world functioned and the place of
progressive, advanced nations within that structure, and second, be stripped of any
desire to develop skills needed to participate in that world. In this case, unless
carefully supervised, aid efforts would produce the opposite of productive
citizens.
As Salole raised concerns among the public through news reports, other
private aid groups took their concerns directly to USAID officials. Some pushedd
for a solution to the famine that would span a greater timeline beyond money
earmarked for only a short period of time within the 1985 fiscal year. Interaction,
the large umbrella organization of over 100 private volunteer agencies, did just
that. In a letter to the chairman of the committee that introduced HR 100 and HR
606, the President of the organization, Peter J. Davies, wrote that the group
commended the legislation which “would provide both higher levels of funding
and a broader range of assistance, including assistance for recovery and
rehabilitation. It is our strongly held view that assistance for recovery and
rehabilitation is just as important as emergency aid. Indeed, unless we make the
extra efforts now to assist African countries in such undertakings as
redevelopment of water resources and rehabilitation and improvement of
agricultural production, we risk increasing their dependence on food aid handouts
instead of encouraging greater self-reliance.”42
If the public and private agencies concerns overlapped about the
destructive tendency of food aid to foster dependence and entitlement thereby
displacing the values of responsibility, self-reliance, and hard-work, government
41
42
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workers within the USAID also remained sensitive to these anxieties. Indeed,
documents circulating in the department since April 1984 revealed that USAID
continued to struggle with the same questions that the public and private aid
groups held over the future of aid and relief. A speech entitled “Disasters: Acts
of God or Acts of Man?”, delivered to the World Affairs Council of Northern
California on April 5, 1984 made its way to the desks of USAID officials. The
speech resonated with workers and made clear arguments that answered many
questions about the meaning of aid assistance. A hand written note at the top of
the speech claimed, “Excellent speech, should be read by everyone in our
business.”43 The initials JM followed the comment.44
The speech opens with a vignette about a disastrous earthquake that struck
Lisbon in 1755. After discussing the reaction to the disaster by the public, to the
author asks audience members to whether “natural disasters – floods, droughts,
famines, hurricanes, tsunamis and the like as well as earthquakes – are Acts of
God or acts of man.”45 In a few simple sentences he forces his audience to
consider that “when disasters happen in the Third World, and droughts and
famines seem to be on the increase in Latin America, Asia and Africa, do we react
properly? Is disaster relief part of the solution – or part of the problem?”46 After
surveying a range of disasters, including the contemporaneous famine in Ethiopia,
for his audience, the speaker begins an analysis of the responses to these
emergencies. He concludes that “one of the myths about disasters is that after an
earthquake or a flood, or during a famine, people sit around in numbed
helplessness waiting for helicopters to fly in with blankets and food. The truth is
almost exactly the opposite: it is the delivery of food and blankets which causes
this dependence and inactivity.”47 The sentiments voiced in this speech which
circulated through USAID offices, echoed the same concerns about the
consequences of aid that started surfacing in the media. For many, aid represented
a fine line: too little and America would be shirking its duty to help heal the world
and change its course, too much and America contributed to the further
degeneration of individual potential. Misdirected aid risked dangerous
consequences.
Without properly managing aid, famine victims risked becoming
dependent on others for survival and in that process faced regressing into acts of
43
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dishonesty and idleness. Taking seriously the consequences on Ethiopia’s future,
aid donors, workers, and officials set out to ensure that a future of idle, dependent
Ethiopians did not occur. They did this by building new cultural expectations
around work habits in carefully managed aid distribution centers.48 Salole
proposed an unofficial solution to the dilemma of dependence by encouraging
food recipients to actively participate in the relief effort by contributing their
labor. He noted that a form of this plan was currently in place in certain areas near
food camps where volunteers built and repaired the dirt roads that Save the
Children’s trucks used. Meanwhile, other aid recipients used their donkeys to
transport food to remote villages. Salole summed up the effort by saying “They’re
not being paid in money or food, they’re doing it as volunteers. That way they
become participants in, rather than objects of the relief effort.” Most importantly,
Salole concluded that “people who work for what they receive are less likely to
come away with the impression that free food is something to which they have
permanently become entitled.”49 For Salole, current aid operations represented a
danger to the larger world structure by enabling dependency. He stated, that in its
current form, “Relief means you can come in and say, ‘Here’s the food, take it.’”
For Salole and other donors like him, relief operations needed a major
readjustment in order to create a new, world that tamped down on dependent
behaviors that exacerbated, or even caused, emergency situations.
Although some media reports did applaud the resiliency of Ethiopian men,
women, and children, it was clear that aid experts felt they needed to properly
manage and channel inner resources like resiliency as a means to guard against
dependency. Without direct supervision and management of aid, officials like
Salole wondered “whether aid provided over a long period may not stifle the
initiative of the recipient” and render them incompetent for a future that required
productivity and industry for survival.50 In part, such a view stemmed from the
juxtaposition of camps, described as a location of progress, technology, and
comfort, and Ethiopian terrain, described as a Biblical backwater.51 Survivors
48
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spent time in camps that were outfitted with “large water-proof tents, street lights,
generators, a hospital, free, hot food and guards at the gate” and which were seen
as “a functioning town with far more amenities than its inhabitants have ever
known before or are likely to know again.” Observers noted that leaving “such an
environment can be traumatic.” Such a line of reasoning reinforced concerns
about dependency and expressed wonder at the apparent willingness of survivors
to remain in a place of comfort that they did not contribute to making.52 Even as
aid workers on the ground and in the urgency of the operation developed makeshift and ad-hoc aid revisions, like Salole’s labor contribution program, the
USAID also worked to re-make conditions in the camps that would alter and
modify certain behaviors. The kind of aid projects chosen for US funding, hinged
on the kinds of goals and aims they articulated in their grant applications. Many
of those chosen targeted the very anxieties over aid-dependency and the
production of liberal citizens that concerned government employees like Julius
Marks.
Remaking the World: Grant-making, claim-making, and the future of
Ethiopia
In spite of Reagan’s staunch reputation as a Cold War warrior, during this period
his public stance towards the larger Cold War conflict edged towards an
appearance of rapprochement as he sought to balance the demands of anti-Soviet
fervor and peace brokers within his administration.53 With more public emphasis
on returning to warmer relations and promises to avoid military conflicts, White
House officials also focused on alternatives to further their vision of a free-market
world order while appearing as the broker of a rapprochement with the Soviets.54
Publicly, in the spirit of the olive branch, they took care to rebuild cultural
relations and work together on science matters like space initiatives.55 Behind the
scenes, however, less conspicuous means offered a way for Reagan to assuage the
concerns of staunch Cold War warriors who feared that Soviet strength would
outpace the capabilities of the US.56 Officials found one such conduit in the form
of emergency aid grants and immediate relief projects that worked to rebuild
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Ethiopia in the image of a liberal state. The 1984-1985 famine functioned as an
important space to implement such projects. Acting on the impulses of public
concern, spurred in large part by media images of the famine, the US government
officially sanctioned and funded private, non-profit programs whose project aims
tied neatly with a neoliberal vision of the future. While on the surface, non-profits
and the US government often appeared at odds, with one favoring liberal agendas
and the other favoring a conservative course, their aims dovetailed neatly because
of the ways each worked in relation to neoliberalism. Reagan’s overt policies and
actions to create a state and world that favored individual property rights, the rule
of law, and institutions of free markets and free trade were supplemented by many
NGOs more subtle measures to shape individual characteristics that would
flourish in such a world.57
In order for the world Reagan and his officials envisioned to survive,
reformers needed to do more than simply forestall dependency. Famine victims
had to learn new skills and attitudes, such as increasing productivity, shoring up
self-reliance, and goal tending, to equip them for the coming liberal oriented
world. Thus, the White House had a special interest in partnering with groups that
encouraged and helped bring about these behaviors in famine victims. If aid
workers on the ground improvised with the behavior transforming programs they
implemented, like Salole’s volunteer contribution program, the White House
agencies like the USAID directed a more methodical and sustainable campaign to
achieve similar results. Three USAID funded projects in particular highlight
White House interest in transformative aid: the CRS health-nutrition surveillance
program, the tent cities of Nathan Abbie, and the well-drilling campaign of
AfriCare.
Because of the vast amount of work that would need to go into the
transformation of Ethiopia as a result of its underdevelopment, how recipients
used the aid they received developed into a source of contention between donors
and victims. In particular, the use and abuse of food-rations became an important
site for transformation. Many donors and media viewers who contributed to the
campaign understood the relief camps and feeding centers as a microcosm of the
progress of the Western world.58 In detailing camp life, reporters focused on the
victims’ desire to remain in the camps in order to take advantage of technology
and progress. Some of these stories emphasized the lengths that aid recipients
went to in order to remain in the camp and be spared the “trauma” of returning to
57
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a life without Western amenities. In particular, reporters seized on Ethiopian
mothers that “nutritionally sabotaged” their children – a condition in which
reportedly mothers kept at least one of their children in a malnourished state so
that her family would not be turned away from the camps.59 While Ethiopian
mothers may have understood this particular use of food as a survival mechanism
for her entire family, aid workers equated it to thievery and manipulation of the
aid system.60 The message sent by news reporters and aid workers throughout the
famine concluded that a future Ethiopia, which included technology and
amenities, entailed cultivating behaviors of honesty, responsibility, and
accountability in famine victims. Like aid disputes taking place in the United
States, there was no room in Ethiopia’s future for mothers who used their children
to take advantage of the system.
A USAID funded Catholic Relief Services project, the Nutritional
Surveillance program, worked to transform behaviors deemed deceptive by
closely managing and shaping individual norms. This program focused on
mothers and children. As children and mothers received their food rations,
program managers also gave them nutrition training. The program closely tracked
and monitored participants through weigh-ins. It was expected that participants
would apply their nutritional training towards the rations they received and thus
experience a weight-gain in malnourished children. An important component of
this program centered on the ideas of community sharing in Ethiopian culture.
According to the grant authors, many of the destitute adults receiving food aid
intended for children took the ration and shared it amongst other family and
possibly community members. To ensure that the ration intended for the children
went undivided, the program monitored the weight of each child enrolled in the
program and provided extra rations to other adults.
Dividing the use of rations, thus preventing the sense of communal
sharing, spoke to the differences in how aid providers and famine victims
understood tragedy or celebration. Preventing sharing of rations emphasized the
individual experience of suffering and foreclosed the communal experience of
tragedy. Accordingly, as NGOs elevated the individual experience of suffering,
they also foregrounded and privileged the individual basis for overcoming
adversity and challenge. Seen in this light, the feeding program helped condition
participants for the rigors of the modern, neoliberal world. Success in this new
world required that individuals understand the importance of self-reliance and
individualism. Participating in the nutrition program allowed Ethiopian mothers
and children the means to gain this crucial experience.
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The second proposed project, the drilling of wells, managed to elevate
efficiency and goal-orientation as the key aspect of survival in the post-famine
Ethiopia. In December 1984 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
commissioned a report on the state of water accessibility and cleanliness near the
displacement camps. As the numbers of displaced persons swelled the relief
centers, camp resources failed to grow accordingly. Water access proved a
growing concern as only a limited number of water wells throughout the camps
had to sustain thousands of campers. In the Bhati Camp, because water access
was insufficient people soon began using nearby river water even though it was
contaminated. Camp authorities deployed fifty-three external “sanitation guards”
to keep people away from the river bed.
Unable to utilize the river and only having access to a few water pumps
meant that 300 to 400 people had to wait for water on a daily basis. In their
investigation of the camps, the project managers noted the response of the camp
doctor towards these conditions, “The doctor did not seem concerned about the
300 to 400 people waiting for water. He agreed that it would be better if they had
more water but thought the waiting was beneficial to the people as it gave them a
goal, something to do, in the very act of waiting they thought they were working
for their water.”61 For the report preparers, the use of time played an important
role in how they interpreted camp life. The doctor understood waiting as an action
that gave hope, or a moment of meaning, in a life overshadowed by death. The
report preparers on the other hand, understood waiting in a much different light.62
Waiting for water represented a passive use of time when the urgency of the
situation required much more active measures. Time was a crucial ingredient in
saving lives and the idea of hundreds of people using time to wait, rather than act,
violated western norms of efficiency and goal orientation – if the goal of camp
life was survival, then campers needed to be doing more than simply waiting
passively to receive water. Building multiple and permanent well sites served as a
way to save lives by providing access to clean water. But it also served as an
important example of aid donors’ understanding of how to use time. Establishing
multiple well sites subverted the camp doctor’s understanding of what marked a
productive goal. Rather than simply waiting in line, displaced persons in the camp
could actively shape their own destiny by more efficiently using time.63
In addition to developing specific liberal behaviors such as individual
accountability (through the nutrition program) and teaching habits that were
crucial to a liberal work-ethic like managing time more efficiently (through the
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well-project), USAID funded projects also worked to foster the importance of
choice-making in everyday life circumstances, a habit that many felt was missing
under Marxist rule. Although many Western viewers internalized the victims as
child-like in their lack of political acumen, an expectation arose that such an
apolitical state was only temporary. With appropriate training and opportunities,
victims could take control of their future through the kinds of choices that they
made. In this way famine victims would grow into responsible beings and
political adults. In ascribing choice-making, or a lack there-of, as an important
feature of the crises, Western media and relief projects pointed to the role of
Mengistu’s government in the creation and sustainment of the famine through the
ways in which they stripped Ethiopians of their right to make choices about where
and how they lived.
Doubts loomed over Mengistu’s intentions to end the famine. Reports
suggested that his aid program and the use of the Ethiopian Relief and
Rehabilitation Committee served as a rouse for squelching the rebels who lived
primarily in famine-stricken areas. Megnistu’s resettlement program served as an
important focal point for these doubts. Resettlement efforts began in earnest in
October 1984 by Ethiopian officials as an attempt to stem the death toll by
moving people from drought stricken Northern provinces in Tigrea and Eritrea to
more fertile lands in the South near the Kishe province.64 Mengistu officials
described the program as completely voluntary and one administrator stated that
he was “surprised by the large outpouring of volunteers” and claiming that there
was “no problem” getting people to relocate.”65 Mengistu initiated resettlement in
order to actively solve the hunger problem.66 When describing the plan to
Western donors, he insisted that those that resettled did so voluntarily. Many in
the Reagan administration refused to believe the resettlement program was
anything other than an attempt to institute forcible collectivization on the peasant
population. Some international aid groups fed this suspicion when they
questioned the tactics used to recruit volunteers to the resettlement areas in
Southern Ethiopia.67 One Red Cross official stated that “we don’t know the
degree to which they are being forced and we don’t know the risks to which
they’ll be exposed.”68 Statements from those who had been resettled appeared to
corroborate these doubts as one peasant “complained that they would need
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bulldozers to clear rocks and trees and tractors to turn the hard virgin soil.”69 Such
comments drew readers’ attention towards the possibility that not all of the
resettlers moved of their own accord. Newspaper and television characterizations
of the government painted a picture of Ethiopian officials working to strip
individuals of essential liberties such as freedom of movement.
Public questions over Megnistu’s motivations came as a boon to U.S.
officials who knew of the famine conditions in Ethiopia long before the breaking
coverage of Buerke’s news documentary, but were reluctant to do anything to
ameliorate the situation.70 At least two years prior to the sweeping news stories of
famine in Africa, Reagan officials opted not to provide aid to a communist
government.71 They reasoned that providing funds to Mengistu’s leadership
would only help the burgeoning leftist country realize national socialistic goals.72
The increased numbers of letters sent into USAID reminding those officials that
“something must be done, current efforts were to be commended, but they were
not enough,” made it clear that a reckoning was about to take place.73 A press
release from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, co-sponsor of the African Famine,
Relief, and Recovery Act of 1985, summed up this response when he wrote that,
“The continuing drought that has afflicted eight African nations in the past decade
has put at risk an estimated 10 million human beings. Since October 1, 1984 the
United States has shipped an estimated 700,000 metric tons of emergency food to
famine-stricken regions of Africa. This is a good start, but it is not enough.”74
Official U.S. policy could no longer ignore circumstances in Ethiopia hoping that
widespread disease and death would topple Mengistu. Acting against the
backdrop of the public’s outcry USAID reworked official policy to their benefit.
If they were to help a communist nation, it would be on their ideological terms.
Luckily for them, it appeared as though the public was on board, and even set the
pace, for those terms. In this way, as the US became a leader in providing aid to
Ethiopia, they were also able to fulfill policy goals through their collaboration
with non-profit aid groups.75
Reagan officials did this by placing non-negotiable conditions on
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emergency aid delivered by the US.76 One of these non-negotiable conditions was
the location and placement of aid. Throughout the famine, the White House
insisted USAID only provide aid to non-resettlement areas.77 One important
example of this policy manifested in the creation of tent-cities. Israeli activistphilanthropist Abie Nathan, working through the American Jewish Committee,
submitted a grant to build an emergency tent city. His intended plan was to build a
safe, sanitary city to act as a relief center for famine victims. Victims arriving in
the cities would find tents to live in and relief to help end hunger. Wary at first,
the US soon described the tent-city as an acceptable plan and if funded it would
“be money well spent.”78 They supported the grant under condition of strict
controls to where Abbie built the cities. Any site had to receive US approval
before any construction could take place. Approved areas meant any land that was
not part of Mengistu’s resettlement schemes that had caused such consternation in
Western media reports. Many of these landed in famine stricken areas that also
happened to be controlled by Ethiopian groups rebelling against Mengistu’s
leadership.
Funding tent cities in rebel controlled areas helped politicize the
emergency and reinforced questions about Mengistu’s resettlement scheme and
the nature of a communist government in its relationship to citizens’ rights.
Although the tent cities served as a means of relief, they also served as an
important contrast to the assumed forced resettlement scheme of Mengistu and
became emblematic of the importance of choice-making in individual life. In US
funded tent-cities famine victims had the choice of where, when, and how to seek
aid. They could go as far or as near their homes as they liked. This served as an
important foil to reports about the lack of choice-making in resettled areas.
Newspapers reported the resettled areas as places where victims were told when
and where they had to report. In addition, journalists portrayed resettled areas as
also affecting the daily lives of every other Ethiopian who did not face starvation;
taking away choice from one group entailed denying choice for other groups.
Journalist Clifford May reported on compulsory activity when he wrote of the
“thousands of Ethiopian college students and teachers” who were “ordered to
spend the summer working with famine victims” who had been resettled in the
south and west of the country. One student stated of his assignment, “I don’t
know anything about plowing or building tukuls (traditional thatched huts used by
Ethiopian peasants.”79
Also reported in the article were concerns about what resettlement meant
for the future of Ethiopian famine victims. One aid official stated that the
76

NARA Cables, NARA Record Group 286.
USAID Reports, NARA Record Group 286.
78
USAID Memorandum, NARA Group 286.
79
Clifford May, “Ethiopia Orders Students to Aid Resettlement” New York Times, June 2, 1985.
77

America and the 1984-1986 Ethiopian Famine 102

resettlement scheme had been poorly designed and that “those being resettled
have little chance to become self-sufficient soon.”80 The victims’ passage into
adulthood and beyond the famine crisis depended, in part, on their ability to make
decisions free from government interference, and the tent cities represented an
oasis in a land dominated by government interference. In this way, tent cities
allowed the US government to emphasize the importance of giving individuals the
freedom to make choices that could and would lead to health and happiness in
life. In keeping famine victims out of resettlement areas, the US worked to
undermine Mengistu’s policies and served as a way to keep the act of choicemaking a relevant point of concern in the eyes of American donors.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the undercurrent of doubt about the aid campaign and the ensuing
work to save bodies firmly rested on understanding aid as a transaction. Media
interpretations of the crisis opened space for Westerners to place claims on the
victims by re-casting Ethiopians in pejorative, childlike caricatures reminiscent of
early depictions of Africans and African-Americans. The larger Cold-War
background further simplified the situation for many Americans. In stripping the
famine of its political complexity and suggesting that Africa needed saving from
the evils of communist leaders, donors imbued the famine with an ideological use;
providing money to Ethiopian famine victims transformed them into tools to save
the world from Communists and allowed donors to regenerate Ethiopian values
and behaviors appropriate to a world free from socialism. As development and
relief merged, the kinds of programs chosen as recipients of federal dollars reveal
how the means to save bodies were also intended to transform those bodies into a
new neoliberal citizen at the conclusion of the famine. The public played a key
role in pushing the Reagan administration into creating preemptive relief and aid
policies by relying heavily on non-profit groups which resulted in closer
relationships between private non-profit groups and US aid agencies. This newly
cemented relationship provided alternative means for the United States to pursue
Cold War policies amidst the evolving relationship between the United States and
the Soviet Union.81 This changed relationship allowed the US to cede much of its
authority in managing many future human rights and humanitarian crises to
private groups.

80

Ibid.
Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition; American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold
War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994):142-143.
81

103 disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

Bibliography
“Birmingham Students Present Famine Check,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1985.
“Expulsions from Ethiopian Camp Suspected,” Washington Post, July 28, 1985,
NARA Record Group 286, Media Folder
“Feeding Ethiopia, Without Illusions,” New York Times, January 19, 1985.
“Letters to the Editor,” Life Magazine, April 1985.
“Remarks on Signing the Bill of Rights Day and the Human Rights Day and
Week Proclamation,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36797 ,
accessed April 4, 2015.
“Valley Schools Pitch In: Students’ Initiative Boosts Famine Aid,” Los Angeles
Times, May 25, 1985.
Africare grant, page 17, NARA Record Group 286.
Alexander De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991).
Alexander Poster, “The Gentle War: Famine Relief, Politics, and Privatization in
Ethiopia, 1983-1986,” Diplomatic History 36 (2012).
Amanda McVety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in
Ethiopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 26-27; Matthew
Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000): 105109.
Carmen Martinez Novo, Who Defines Indigenous: Identities, Development,
Intellectuals, and the State in Northern Mexico (New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 2006): 10-11, 143-147.
Clifford May, “Ethiopia Orders Students to Aid Resettlement” New York Times,
June 2, 1985.
Clifford May, “Field Notes on the Psychology of Famine,” New York Times, June
9, 1985.
Clifford May, “For Uprooted Ethiopians, Life Greener in the Hill,” New York
Times, January 21, 1985.

America and the 1984-1986 Ethiopian Famine 104

David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life
Magazine, April 1985.
David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005): 64 and Laurie Ouellette, “Take Responsibility for Yourself:
Judge Judy and the Neo-liberal Citizen.” In Reality TV: Remaking
Television Culture, edited by Susan Murray and L. Ouellette. New York:
New York University Press, 2004.
Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
Edwin J. Jr., “A Plan for Rescuing Starving Ethiopians,” Washington Post,
December 27, 1984.
Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: the making and unmaking of the world (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1985): 162.
Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill and Wang,
1982): 8-9. I place Rosenberg’s conception of expansion in the context of
emergency situations.
Irvin Molotsky, “Relief Official Accuses Ethiopia of ‘Biting the Hand’ that Feeds
it,” New York Times, December 13, 1984.
Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of
Humanitarianism, (Minneaplois: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000).
Joceyln Lim Chua, “Making Time for the Children: Self-temporalization and the
Cultivation of the Antisuicidal Subject in South India,” Cultural
Anthropology 26 (2012).
John Ashworth, “The Relationship Between Capitalism and Humanitarianism,”
The American Historical Review 92 (1987): 816.
John Tinker, “Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?” Speech to the World
Affairs Council of Northern California, April 1984, NARA, Record Group
286.
Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief, and Media (UK: Sean Kingston Press, 2010);
Clifford May, “U.S. Will Give Development Aid to Ethiopia,” New York
Times, May 9, 1985; Joseph Berger, “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia
Are Pouring Into Relief Agencies,” New York Times, October 26, 1984.

105 disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory

Joseph Berger, “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia Are Pouring into Relief
Agencies,” New York Times, October 28, 1984.
Letter to VP Bush, File Folder: Project Ethiopia, Drought Declared, Box 6,
Record Group 286.
Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S.
Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2001): 89 and Melani McAllister gets at this in her work Epic Encounters:
Culture, Media, & US Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2005): 40 and 80-83 and her
discussions of “benevolent supremacy.”
Melani McAllister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & US Interests in the
Middle East since 1945 (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
2005): 148.
Michael Buerk News Report of Ethiopia,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYOj_6OYuJc, accessed August 1,
2014.
NARA Cables, NARA Record Group 286.
Pamela K. Stone, “A History of Western Medicine, Labor, and Birth,” in
Childbirth Across Cultures: Ideas and practices of pregnancy, childbirth,
and the Postpartum, ed. Helaine Selin (Amherst: Springer Verlag, 2009),
50.
Peter Biles, “Too Great a Burden,” The World Today 56 (2000):4-6.
Philip Boffey , “Ethiopia Moving 1.5 million people from famine,” New York
Times, 14 December 1984.
Press Release from Senator Moynihan, January 31, 1985, NARA Record Group
286.
Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the
End of the Cold War, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1994).
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 2003): 22-23.

America and the 1984-1986 Ethiopian Famine 106

Tanja Muller, “The Ethiopian Famine’ revisited: Band Aid and the antipolitics of
celebrity humanitarian action,” Disasters 37 (2013): 62 and Alexander
Poster, “The Gentle War: Ethiopian Relief, Politics, and Privatization in
Ethiopia, 1983-1986,” Diplomatic History 36 (2012):405-407.
Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle For Civil Rights
in the North (New York: Random House, 2008): 394-396, 519-521, 524529.
USAID Memorandum, NARA Group 286.
USAID Reports, NARA Record Group 286.
Walter Johnson, Soul By Soul; Life Inside The Antebellum Slave Market,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) is useful here with his ideas
of survival and agency in the context of American slavery.
WASH Field Report, No. 138, December 1984, NARA record group 286, File
Folder: Ethiopia Commodities Service Report, 2 of 2.

